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Two social movements have reshaped development aid from within over the past 15 years. The first is the Goal Movement, an attempt by aid policymakers to unify their efforts around measurable declines in poverty by a fixed date. The second is the Evaluation Movement, an attempt by aid researchers to more reliably measure the poverty impacts of aid interventions.
The two movements appear at first to complement each other: Both, in some way, emphasize results over process, outcomes over inputs. But many years into the Goal Movement, only a slim fraction of all aid projects receive any rigorous impact evaluation-that is, any reliable assessment of how results with the project were different from what they would have been without the project (Savedoff et al. 2006) . Why have these two movements failed, so far, to reinforce each other?
I argue that this is not an accident. Features of the Goal Movement-as codified in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)-have partially obstructed the Evaluation Movement. I suggest that this arises from the incentives faced by proponents of the two movements, and I illustrate the conflicts between the two movements with a case study of how impact evaluation is done in one major aid project now underway in Africa. But things can get better. I will propose ways that both the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement can change to become more complementary.
The two movements: Goals and Evaluation
The Goal Movement that swept the development policy world in the late 1990s is the latest manifestation of recurring pattern: When political change threatens aid budgets, aid agencies justify their spending by linking it to measurable development outcomes. The recent ascent of the Evaluation Movement began around the same time as the most recent wave of the Goal Movement, the mid-1990s, among a group of academic development economists based primarily in the United States (e.g. Kremer 2005, Gertler et al. 2011) . They began to measure the effects of development projects with more reliable analytical tools adapated from the fields of psychology, public heath, and labor economics. These studies often gave radically different results from more traditional qualitative, retrospective, or anecdotal evaluation methods (e.g. Glewwe et al. 3 2004 , Banerjee et al. 2010 ). This has contributed to a parallel movement in the development policy world to justify antipoverty spending by focusing on projects that have greater, well-measured impacts for scarce resources (Savedoff et al. 2006 , Szekely 2011 ).
The Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement have much in common. Both have helped shift aid practitioners' attention from project process (such as schools built) toward development outcomes (such as child learning). Leaders of both movements would like to see a large share of aid interventions rebuilt around achieving measurable results (e.g. Sachs 2006 , Banerjee 2007 . But below the surface lie important conflicts between the Goal Movement in its recent manifestation and the Evaluation Movement.
Features of the Millennium Development Goals present a powerful obstacle to wider use of rigorous impact evaluation, and thus prevent the two movements from reinforcing one another. To explain how this happens, and how things might get better, we need an understanding of the incentives faced by advocates.
How conflicts between goals and evaluation can arise
Potential conflicts between development goals and impact evaluation are described in the model of advocacy and evaluation due to Pritchett (2002) . He begins with the plausible assumptions that 1) rigorous evaluation requires the cooperation of project advocates, 2)
advocates care more about development outcomes than the public that must fund them, and 3) advocates' dual objective is to improve development outcomes and raise money.
Advocates can raise money either by -evaluation‖-rigorously demonstrating that their impacts exceed those from alternative aid projects-or by -persuasion‖-winning over funders with exaggerated claims of impact.
The model predicts that the amount of learning through rigorous impact evaluation will be less than socially optimal: For advocates, it can -pay to be ignorant‖. Projects with little impact can prevent careful evaluation from occurring and face little incentive to spend scarce resources on evaluation. But beyond that, even projects with positive 4 impacts-even if evaluation were free-might prefer persuasion over evaluation if they face funders who place a low weight on development progress. Such funders might include swing-voter taxpayers in donor democracies. Duflo and Kremer (2005) point out an additional political problem: If enough advocates choose persuasion over evaluation, the field can enter a low-level equilibrium: funders prefer advocates seeking maximum impact divert support to advocates who persuade via exaggeration, further lowering the returns to evaluation for any individual advocate.
The collision of the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement can usefully be seen through the lens of this model. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, there was a decline in the importance of overseas development efforts to donor-country taxpayers.
Those still willing to fund aid demanded more evidence of results. Advocates who cared more about those results than the average taxpayer, and wished to defend aid budgets, could respond in one of two ways: evaluate or persuade. The more socially beneficial option would be rigorous evaluation-identifying projects with low impact, diverting funding towards those with higher impact, and thereby raising taxpayers' willingness to pay. This socially beneficial approach would be popular among academics whose funding depends more on the rigor of their approach than on the outcome of the evaluation.
But this socially beneficial option would represent a pure, private cost to numerous development advocates. They would not benefit from the information generated by rigorous evaluation if they were already convinced of the effectiveness of their project, and they would only stand to lose funding, unless their true impacts were sufficiently high to catch the attention of median-voter taxpayers who place relatively little importance on overseas development outcomes. Both of advocates' dual objectives would thus be harmed by greater use of rigorous evaluation. As funders get increasingly skeptical, most advocates would choose persuasion over evaluation. Again, as Pritchett points out, this could be optimal even for advocates whose projects' true impact is positive, if funders do not care to fund moderately effective projects-either because funders are insufficiently altruistic or because funders prefer to support other projects willing to persuade with exaggerated claims.
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An alternative way for advocates to respond to the political changes of the 1990s would be to formulate a set of development goals. In Pritchett's model, the role of these goals would be to convince increasingly skeptical taxpayers that their money was being used to achieve measurable changes in development outcomes. But the model makes a critical prediction about how this would occur: For numerous advocates that would benefit more from persuasion than evaluation, such goals would best be designed not only to persuade without rigorous impact evaluation, but to persuade in ways that prevent rigorous impact evaluation.
Goals that undermine good impact evaluation
This model can explain key features of the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement as they exist today. It can explain why, this far into the results-oriented Goal
Movement, so few projects receive rigorous evaluation: Advocates can control whether that evaluation occurs, and encouraging rigorous evaluation is privately optimal for few of them. The model also explains why the Goal Movement has taken a form that creates obstacles to rigorous impact evaluation.
The Millennium Development Goals fit this description. They were designed to raise funds for aid projects by highlighting results and asserting that knowledge and institutions exist to achieve those results. They have successfully done so. But they have at least three traits that impede rigorous impact evaluation.
First, the goals treat changes in outcomes as technological problems devoid of social context. The targets in the Millennium Development Goals are the same for all countries.
All countries pledge to achieve 100% primary completion by 2015, whether they are starting at 30% or starting at 90%-even if meeting the goal would require faster 6 increases in schooling than any on record (Clemens 2004 For another thing, it encourages myopia in any evaluation of efforts to meet the goals.
The long-term effects, institutional sustainability, and financial sustainability of efforts to meet the goals would be little-considered in any evaluation. All such concerns are irrelevant to short-term, time-bound goals. Woolcock (2009) points out that rigorous evaluation must be built around the expected time-path of results from that project, a time-path whose medium-and long-run aspects are invisible to the MDGs. The consequence is to distort impact evaluation:
-As things currently stand, however, […] international mandates to achieve ‗targets' (such as the Millennium Development Goals) generate a net effect, in which the development industry ends up reverse engineering itself, strongly preferring ‗high initial impact' projects over projects that might actually respond to the problems that poor countries themselves deem a priority […] .‖ Third, the goals create accountability for inputs, but not effects. The MDGs, like the Pearson Commission goals before them, make donors subject to international shame if aid increases asserted to cause the goals' achievement are not met. But they create no accountability for any of the measurable, time-bound changes in development outcomes they prescribe. Put differently, donor taxpayers and the governments they elect will be subject to embarrassment if aid does not rise, but no person, project, organization, or government will see its prospects changed in the slightest if any of the outcome goals are not met, by any margin. To the question, -Who will lose his or her job if these goals are not met?‖ the response of the MDGs is silence.
This lack of accountability fosters a culture of impact evaluation in which little premium is placed on independence and transparency. The easiest way to assess a project's -effects‖ for funding decisions is to use evaluations performed by employees of the project, using confidential data making moralistic assertions about the imperative to carry out one of many antipoverty solutions, based on firsthand anecdotes and opaque statistics.
Deaton (2008) summarizes this approach as -technical solutions buttressed by moral certainty.‖ If project leaders face no accountability to deliver results, there is little reason for them to support independent assessments of impact based on transparent outcome data and careful analysis.
The absence of accountability in the MDGs promotes this result. If there is no cost to project advocates from assessements of project impact that differ from their own, there is no incentive to take the trouble to set up independent evaluation mechanisms.
Corroborating this idea, among the slim fraction of aid projects that are rigorously evaluated, only a miniscule number are evaluated using independently-collected data and/or independent analysis (Savedoff et al. 2006) .
A case study in the collision of goals and evaluation
This story becomes clearer if we consider a specific case where the Goal What the project did instead was to issue a series of public statements that illustrate how the core tenets of the MDGs obstruct a more rigorous evaluation of the project's impacts.
As before, I will divide these obstacles to impact evaluation into three types: those that arise from 1) the lack of social and political context in the MDGs, 2) the time-bound urgency of the MDGs, and 3) the lack of accountability for results in the MDGs.
1

Obstacles arising from the lack of social and political context in the MDGs
I argued above that the lack of context in the MDGs defines meeting the goals as a technical problem, and would lead evaluation efforts to focus on technical efficacy (TOT effect) rather than the project effect (ITT effect). Advocates would face a strong incentive to confuse the two effects in fundraising efforts, even though this might result in a large exaggeration of the project effect.
The MVP did confuse the TOT effect and the ITT effect in its response to the revelation that many of the -effects‖ or -achievements‖ the MVP claimed for itself were occurring in surrounding areas and nationwide. In a further sign of the evaluation confusion encouraged by the MDGs, the project responded that impact evaluation was unnecessary, because rigorous impact evaluation is only informative when an intervention is -unproven‖, and many elements of the package intervention are ostensibly -proven‖:
-Progress towards the MDG targets is less about designing novel interventions and technologies, and much more about creating effective local systems to put these proven interventions into practice. The main research questions are not simply ‗does it work?', but rather how to overcome complex implementation and financial challenges in a diverse range of poor and hard-to-reach communities.‖ A further consequence of the MDG framing of aid interventions as technical, acontextual solutions is a lack of concern about the external validity of evaluation results. The
Millennium Village intervention sites were chosen specifically because the designers thought that the project might work better at those sites than at other sites. It is therefore difficult to infer from changes at the demonstration sites how the same project might affect other areas. When we pointed this out, the project protested, -Clemons [sic] and Demombynes claim that the choice of villages was somehow ‗subjective' rather than rigorous and evidence-based. In fact, this issue has already been discussed at length in a peer-reviewed and registered evaluation process (The Lancet, protocol number 09PRT-8648). … Sites were chosen ‗purposively' to represent over 95% of the agro-ecological zones on the continent reflecting a variety of systems-level challenges, disease profiles, and baseline levels of infrastructure and capacity. Within each country, selection criteria included rural areas with high rates of poverty and where at least 20% of children were undernourished.
[…] These data refute any insinuation that the Millennium Villages were somehow systematically advantaged at the outset of the project.‖ 14 This confident statement is directly contradicted by the same research protocol it cites.
That protocol reads, -The non-random selection of intervention communities has the potential to introduce bias … issues of feasibility, political buy-in, community ownership and ethics also featured prominently in village selection for participation.‖
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The existence of competent and cooperative local partners is key to any project's success, and those who have worked in the field know that it can be rare for the right elements to come together in any given community. The project's own documentation then gives good reason to believe that its effects might be less in communities that were not specially selected to have competent and cooperative local partners. But when the problem of meeting the MDGs is framed as a technical problem to be solved after all political and social obstacles to implementation have been solved-as the MDGs dotechnical evaluation should be unconcerned by such limitations, and results from one social, political, and economic setting should be more readily assumed to apply wholesale to a different setting.
Finally, I discussed above how the MDGs distort the discussion of project costs. Costs are an essential component of useful impact evaluation, since there are competing potential uses for every aid dollar. Costs go unmentioned in the MDGs, except to the extent that aid must ostensibly rise by some amount in order to achieve the goals. If improving development outcomes is a technical problem of implementing interventions whose TOT effect is known-as the MDGs define the problem-cost is only relevant for donors to the extent that it indicates whether they can or cannot afford to pay for the technical interventions that achieve the goals. MVP publications universally discuss cost in this light, portraying cost as low in some unspecified, absolute sense.
But the TOT effect per unit cost is not helpful to funders choosing between projects, as they should, according to the ITT effect per unit cost. The MVP does not undertake any analysis of the effects of alternative uses of the same money spent on the project. The cost of the MVP intervention is high: On average, the intervention requires on-site expenditures of US$160 per year, for every man, woman, and child at the intervention sites. 16 While the project's public documents are not clear about what this number includes, it does not appear to include many off-site costs, such as the office space of the Earth Institute in New York that is devoted to the project.
The project has not publicly released any analysis, at the time of this writing, on the costeffectiveness of its antipoverty intervention. This makes its economic impacts opaque.
But even if the impacts claimed by the project were rigorously assessed, they would be uninformative about whether the project is efficient or wasteful in achieving those impacts.
The first thing to note about the cost of the project is that it this on-site expenditure represents a gigantic intervention in the local economy. For example, income per capita at the project's flagship site, Sauri, Kenya, is roughly US$145 per year. 17 In other words, the annual MVP intervention is enormous in context. It is larger in economic terms than the entire local economy.
Very large effects can and should be expected from interventions of this magnitude. If the same money were simply handed out as cash for the duration of the intervention, it would more than double local income per capita, with numerous consequent improvements in education, health, and other social indicators that typically arise from unconditional cash transfers to the very poor (e.g. Baird et. al 2011) . In order for the project to be a superior intervention against income poverty relative to distributing cash, it must raise incomes either to a degree or duration (or both) that makes the present value of the economic effect exceed the cost. The simple analysis in Figure 2 suggests that if the project raises local incomes by anything less than 100%, that effect must persist for at least 10 years after the project stops pumping resources into the local economy. If 10-year sustained increase is any smaller, or if the 100% increase is sustained for any less than ten years, the local population would have experienced a greater economic benefit from a simple cash transfer in the amount of the project's cost. Put differently, this would mean that switching from a cash transfer to the MVP would economically harm local residents while it economically benefits people employed by the project.
This back-of-the-envelope calculation obviously requires refinement. But it does suggest that the cost of the project is large enough that there is serious doubt about whether it is better than cash transfers-in the absence of giant increases in income lasting for a decade or more after the intervention ends. At this point there is no evidence of any kind that such massive and lasting increases in income will occur at the sites. 
Obstacles arising from the time-bound urgency of the MDGs
The Millennium Declaration and the MDGs portray the problem of underdevelopment as an urgent crisis that, with sufficient -determination‖, can be solved in a few years. This framing of the problem serves to erode support for careful evaluation of any related projects, as one would ridicule a painstakingly precise evaluation of emergency food aid in an acute famine.
On these grounds the MVP has categorically rejected the idea that its claims of long-term impact undergo any evaluation at all before massive new resources are pulled away from alternative projects to be devoted to the MVP. The MVP (2011a, 2011b) has stated that its effects will be self-sustaining and will outlast the project. Because other village-level package interventions have seen their effects quickly disappear after external money stops coming in (Chen, Mu, and Ravallion 2009), Clemens and Demombynes (2011) recommend that impact evaluation test these claims of sustained impact at a point 5-10 years after project completion-that is, 10-15 years after the project began-before the project is massively expanded at the expense of alternative uses of aid money. The project mocked this idea:
-Clemens and Demombynes also suggest that efforts to take interventions to scale should wait at least 15 years until evidence of long-term effects can be proven and sustained. This assertion cannot be taken seriously. … It would be the height of folly to delay … Economists like Clemens and Demombynes should stop believing that the alleviation of suffering needs to wait for their controlled cluster randomized trials.‖
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While it is clear from the above that the authors consider anyone requiring evidence of their strong claims to be immoral promoters of suffering, it does not answer the key question: If a project claims to have impacts that last long after its intensive five-year intervention, how is it possible to evaluate those impacts in less than 5-10 years after the project ends?
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The MVP goes out of its way to state that it is not -charity‖; it is a project to create lasting freedom from poverty traps, not an emergency humanitarian project to end suffering. The effects of this project after the intervention ends are not known and cannot be known without evaluation years after it ends. The project was not described to its funders as a project to end suffering temporarily while large amounts of money were flowing, suffering that would return immediately after it ended. Rather, it was described as a project that, with a one-time intensive intervention, would cause lasting change. Such a claim can only be assessed with an impact evaluation on the timescale of the stated goals.
But the MDGs, in order to urge action by potential funders, redefine the problem of development as a short-term problem. If -development‖ and -poverty alleviation‖ are reduced to meeting very short-term targets on specific indicators, the only relevant form of impact evaluation is a form that assesses short-term impacts. Myopia of this sort is a reasonable response to the incentives created by the MDGs, which say nothing at all about long-term development trajectories, how those might be changed, or how such changes might be assessed.
Another symptom of the MDGs' short-term, moralistic framing of the development problem in the MVP evaluation is the project's pattern of resistance to comparing treated and untreated villages-a stance that makes sense in the context of a crisis or emergency.
Three years into the project, in 2007, its leaders maintained the policy that no data would be collected at sites not receiving the intervention. They believed that such data collection was unethical, writing, -For ethical and practical reasons, there are no formal ‗control' villages. Instead, project impact is assessed by rigorous before-an-after comparisons and detailed studies by sector. … The ethical reasons relate to the fact that many core interventions (e.g., malaria control, access to safe water) are life-saving and would be ethically inappropriate to deny in a control village.‖
21
This does not follow. Collecting data from an untreated area is not the same thing as -denying‖ the intervention-except in an emergency with unlimited resources, where the only obstacle to treatment is -determination‖. Unless there is sufficient funding and other resources to offer the intervention to the entire population simultaneously, the existence of untreated areas is a fact that the project cannot change. An outcome that is beyond the project's control cannot be described as the responsibility of the project. Certainly the MVP had nothing close to the resources necessary to treat even one entire province of one country, much less the entire populations of ten countries. Gathering information on outcomes beyond the project's control does not implicate the project any more than a war correspondent's work makes him or her responsible for warfare.
The project later revised this stance, and in 2008 issued a research protocol requiring untreated comparison sites. 20 But there was lasting damage to the impact evaluation, because the project's refusal of comparison sites meant that no -baseline‖ (initial) data were collected at many of those sites. This has prevented comparison of trends at treated sites to trends at untreated sites during the same time period. This is another example of the direct harm to careful evaluation done by the short-term-crisis mentality underlying the MDGs.
Another common objection, also voiced by the MVP, is that rigorous impact evaluation is extraordinarily costly. Rigorous impact evaluation is simply impact evaluation that considers seriously and objectively what would have happened without the project. One easy way to do this, as we did in the graphs of Figure 1 and others like it, is to compare trends at the intervention sites to trends away from those sites. All of the data we used to conduct that comparison were available for free online, as is the software necessary to conduct analysis. In many situations, careful consideration of the counterfactual can cost little or nothing. Random selection of the intervention sites, which would have greatly raised the credibility of the MVP impact evaluation results, is also costless in and of 20 Available at http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT01125618
itself. Intervention sites must be chosen by some method, and selecting them at random is a simple matter of having a spreadsheet generate random numbers.
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Obstacles arising from the lack of accountability in the MDGs
The MDGs are silent on the subject of who will be held responsible if any of the changes in development outcomes-poverty, schooling, mortality-are not met. Because no person or organization therefore has an extrinsic stake in the outcome, this serves to undermine support for independent, objective, transparent assessments of outcome that are sine qua non of rigorous impact evaluation.
Again the stance of the MVP on impact evaluation fits these incentives. The first response of the project to the critiques by Clemens and Demombynes (2011) In one such study, 22 Jeffrey Sachs and several colleagues attempt to measure the effect of the MVP intervention on child malnutrition. They do so by comparing trends in one malnutrition indicator, child stunting (height for age, <2 years), at several intervention sites during the project to the national-level trend in child stunting during the two decades prior to the project.
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As we point out in a comment published shortly afterwards by the same journal (Clemens and Demombynes 2012) , this research method is badly misleading because it involves the selective reporting of results flattering to the project. Prior to the project, national trends in child malnutrition were indeed flat for the countries in question for many years. But during the project, almost all of these countries were experiencing large national declines in child malnutrition as sub-Saharan Africa entered a period of relative prosperity.
Furthermore, the paper tests the effects of the intervention on three different measures of child malnutrition (stunting, underweight, and wasting), finds a significant effect on only one of these (stunting), and reports only that finding in its abstract, introduction, and conclusion. It reaches its conclusion on stunting based on the incorrect use of levels of statistical significance that would only be appropriate if the effect on stunting was tested in isolation. The project's analysis, carried out internally with data accessible only to the project, therefore tends to substantially exaggerate the impact of the intervention.
Why would the project compare trends at the sites in one time period to trends nationwide in a different and irrelevant time period? We can eliminate two possible reasons. In our own analysis we used data on the same malnutrition outcome, publicly available for many of the same countries during the period of the intervention, and we showed that there were substantial declines regionwide and nationwide for the countries and time period in question. We provided our analysis to three co-authors of the malnutrition study a year before their work was submitted for publication. It is therefore unlikely that they were unaware that nationwide data were available during the period of the project, or unaware of the regionwide and nationwide declines in child malnutrition occurring at the time of the intervention.
It is difficult to see why independent scientists would have chosen to make the same odd Independent evaluation would have been more credible. But again, the total silence of the MDGs on accountability for results implies that independent evaluation serves no clear purpose.
In response to the above concerns about independent evaluation, the MVP leadership wrote, -There has been much discussion regarding whether an evaluation that is not ‗independent' can be truly rigorous. These perspectives were surprising to me coming from the public health field-where virtually all primary research is conducted by the investigators themselves. The amount of oversight within the MV project is quite striking in fact. We are independently overseen by 11 institutional review boards to whom we report annually.‖ There is no substitute for independent, disinterested analysis. But project advocates have little reason to encourage independent evaluation-and every reason to fight it-as long as they are not accountable for the success or failure of a project to deliver the changes in development outcomes it promises. By omitting any such accountability mechanisms, the MDG vision of development directly undermines independent and rigorous impact evaluation.
Raising money for development interventions frequently requires project implementers to make promises to donors, promises of large impacts. Competition among grant-seekers can lead to pressures for overpromising larger and larger impacts. This inherently creates pressure on implementers to report the impacts they promised, a set of incentives that can shape research decisions and interpretation. Again, I do not speak of ethical lapses, but rather of a cognitive coloring generated by strong incentives. I believe that even the most ethical scientist could be susceptible to such coloring because it is inherent to human nature. The problem is not moral but institutional, and the solution is institutional: Impact evaluation should be executed by analysts independent of the fundraising and implementing apparatus (Savedoff, Levine, and Birdsall 2006) .
A further natural consequence of the MDGs' lack of accountability for specific results is that projects can report success by simply redefining success. The MVP has stated numerous different goals since it began. On one hand, the project states that its purpose is not to prove impacts, because the interventions are already -proven‖, but rather to -to design and document effective delivery systems‖ for these -proven‖ interventions, and that Clemens and Demombynes' (2011) focus on development outcomes -reflects a basic misunderstanding of the MVP's goals and purpose‖. 26 But these statements are bewildering when the project's evaluation reports (MVP 2010 (MVP , 2011b analysts are more likely to avoid eliding from one set of goals to another as a project proceeds, but again, the MDGs define such independence as unnecessary by defining accountability as irrelevant to the grand global project of development.
Conclusions
There are many ways that the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement conflictas the two movements have evolved so far. This provides one partial explanation for the scarcity of rigorous impact evaluation even at this late stage of the Goal Movement. But this can change, and the two movements could become more complementary.
There is an opportunity, now, to change this dynamic. The Millennium Development Goals expire in 2015, and today there is an active debate about what comes next. 27 There is likely to be a new set of goals, and those goals could be built to help the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement complement each other to attract and target funding. This could happen in at least three ways.
1. Development goals that are country-specific would define the development problem to be inherently contextual, rather than a technical problem whose achievement depends solely on dedication and expenditure. Country-specific schooling goal, for example, would be to double past rates of progress or halve the gap between current and universal schooling rates; both of these account for country-specific context. This would draw attention away from evaluations of technical efficacy (Treatment-On-Treated effects) and toward the more policyrelevant evaluations of project effect (Intent-To-Treat effects). It would make cost 28 estimates more informative, shifting evaluation efforts from measuring cost-perunit-if-successfully delivered to measuring cost-of-causing-units-to-besuccessfully-delivered. The latter is much more useful to funders wishing to meet the new goals and making decisions about how to allocate scarce resources.
2. Development goals that are long-term would lessen the -crisis‖ case for casting careful analysis aside, and direct more effort toward learning to solve long-term problems. It would assist rigorous evaluation by encouraging evaluations that match the stated goals upon which funders base project allocation decisions, such as deciding between two projects that claim long-term sustained impact. It would reinforce the notion that careful impact evaluation does not stand in the way of ethical advocates taking emergency action; careful impact evaluation is a useful tool for advocates seeking ethically to do the most lasting good with scarce aid resources in places undergoing long-term structural change.
3. Development goals that specify any degree of accountability for changes in outcomes, for any person or organization, would also assist rigorous impact evaluation. When any portion of the extrinsic motivations of advocates hinge directly on results, the stakes are higher and the pressure for objective criteria of success increases. This would create more pressure for independent and transparent analysis of impacts-elements that are critical components of any impact analysis that is to be called rigorous. Accountability, that is to say, encourages learning.
In short, the Goal Movement and the Evaluation Movement need not be antagonistic.
They share common objectives: to demonstrate development results to a skeptical audience. The current discussions about new goals present a rare opportunity to bring the two movements into greater partnership. 
